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INTRODUCTION
Appellee's Brief has great difficulty presenting a coherent rationale for the
Judgment it attempts to defend.
Thus, appellee asserts that, in response to appellee's claim "throughout the
proceedings below that the Mayflower Defendants were not entitled to any owelty" (Brief
at 18, n. 2), the referees and District Court found no "inequality" which could justify
"owelty" in the physical partition ordered. Brief at 26-29. Still, appellee is compelled to
argue that, "The trial Court's award of owelty to the Mayflower defendants, consisting of
entitlements for four lots in the Northside Neighborhood, is not clearly erroneous." Brief
at 24.
Unable to explain why the District Court ignored appellants' demand for an
accounting set out in the stipulated Pretrial Order (§ II, B. 2), appellee is compelled to
pretend that the wholly undefended claim for accounting was just a claim for "owelty"
(Brief at 24), which, despite the District Court's necessarily implied finding that "a
partition cannot be made equally among the parties without prejudice to [one] of them", did
not impose upon appellee the burden to show the "net value" of its admitted use of the
co-tenancy in its admittedly exclusive development scheme.
Failing to explain the District Court's inexplicable inversion of appellee's
unequivocal testimony that its faxed promise to appellants represented that it would not
seek partition havingfirstannexed and accepted a density approval for appellants' property,
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appellee is compelled to explain the admitted waiver as merely a fraud, secretly intended to
be withdrawn on the eve of the annexation and Development Agreement. Brief at 22-23.
Finally, there being no justification for use of the parties' properties jointly, at the
demand of Park City, to achieve approval of far more development than could have been
obtained by use of the properties separately, then bringing an action to separate the
properties, according the whole enhanced development to appellee's land, appellee resorts
to a claim that such exclusive use of a co-tenancy, however profitable, is not compensable
unless it causes out-of-pocket loss. Brief at 37-41.
The difficulty in explaining and defending the Judgment is that, while it recognized
that the partition imposed permits appellee to use appellants' property for very substantial
profits to appellee, the District Court declined to order an accounting and sharing of this
development, not because it was not required by law, but because to do so required a further
proceeding.
In fact, the District Court found, in keeping with the referees' finding, that a simple
partition was unequal and prejudicial without an award to appellants of part of the
approvals obtained by appellee's use of the co-tenancy. Ruling, 07/13/04 at 5-6. It was
unnecessary for appellants to show "great prejudice" as that is only the standard for
requiring sale in lieu of partition. § 78-39-12, U.C.A. (1953).
In fact, appellee explicitly and unequivocally waived the right to seek partition to
enforce a "density determination" for appellants' property to which appellant did not
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consent. The District Court simply misperceived the unequivocal testimony. In fact, the
District Court failed to observe that appellee's promise, in the context in which appellee's
president testified it occurred, was that appellee would not seek partition without a "joint
venture" for "joint development", accounting for and sharing proportionally the
development obtained by its use of the co-tenancy.
In fact, the District Court simply ignored a proper demand for an accounting, which
imposed no burden upon appellants to show the "net value" of appellee's admitted gain
from exclusive use of the co-tenancy, and entitled appellants to a proportional share thereof
regardless of out-of-pocket loss.
In fact, the District Court thus imposed upon appellants, as a condition to obtaining
"owelty", a burden to show "what the 'net value' of the Northside Neighborhood
development lots would be" and "the fair market value of the Northside Neighborhood lots
minus the development costs [thereof]", prior to the final definition and approval of such
lots, while their sale was illegal, and before any admissible evidence of "net value" existed.
This burden belonged to appellee as a matter of law as well as of its promise to appellants.
The District Court allowed appellee to avoid it, because requiring appellee to provide the
accounting it owed "at this point would require an expensive trial."
In fact, the District Court purported to enforce the "owelty" determination of a
"majority" of two of three referees, after one of the two had "changed his mind" and formed
a new majority with the third in recommending a larger allocation to appellants. Ruling,
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07/13/04, at 5-6. Appellants made all the showing necessary to engage the District Court's
"power to make compensatory adjustment among parties according to the principles of
equity." § 78-39-41, U.C.A. (1953). They failed to obtain an appropriate award because
the District Court, ignoring an uncontested claim for an accounting and misperceiving
appellee's promise not to seek partition without providing one, imposed an improper
burden of proof.
The proper disposition here was simple: decline to partition unless and until appellee
kept its promise not to partition without accounting for and sharing the development. If,
because appellee brought its action before finalizing the approvals obtained or pricing the
development, an admissible accounting required a further proceeding, so be it. It was not
for the District Court to avoid the "expense" of an accounting by imposing upon appellants
the far greater expense of theft of their property rights.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee's Statement of the Case and Course of Proceedings is a thinly veiled, but
not very acute, argument.
Appellee's re-interpretation of the Referees' proceedings and Recommendation is
essentially irrelevant. The evidence showed that the Referees had been denied crucial
information, namely, that annexation of appellants' land was a condition to developing
appellee's land. Had the information been provided, the "neutral" referee would have sided
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with the minority referee, to form a different majority. Ruling 07/13/04 at 5-6. Thus, the
so-called Majority Recommendation evaporated at trial.
In fact, the only function played by the Referees' Report in this case was to provide
the District Court a basis appellee could not dispute for awarding part of the approvals to
appellants, after it had concluded that the physical partition sought by appellee was
inequitable, but declined to order the accounting due because "to do so at this point would
require an expensive trial" of evidence not yet available.

MATTERS "NOT APPEALED"
The point of appellee's specification of findings and conclusions not appealed is not
obvious.
While it is true that appellants do not directly challenge any of the District Court's
Findings of Fact labeled as such, this disposes in entirety of appellees' claim about failure
to marshal the evidence. Rule 24(a)(9), U.R.A.P.: the requirement to marshal the evidence
applies only to contests of findings. The District Court's finding of no "great prejudice"
goes only to whether a sale was required in lieu of partition. § 78-39-12, U.C.A. (1953).
Of course, Appellants have appealed whether the partition ordered is "fair and
equitable", because they assert that a different sharing of the development was required.
This includes any permissible appeal of the Referees' Report, insofar as it is incorporated
in the Judgment.
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The property in Wasatch County, not being affected by appellee's development
scheme with Park City, is irrelevant to this appeal.

Appellants did not appeal the

annexation, at least in part because they are statutorily prohibited from doing so.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellee's statement of Issues Presented for Review outlines both the errors of the
Judgment, and of appellee's attempted defense of the judgment.
Appellee states "Issue No. 1", as "was the trial court's finding that United Park did
not intend to waive its inherent right to partition the jointly owned real property clearly
erroneous?" Appellee asserts, further, that appellants were required to "marshal the
evidence" in support of such finding and demonstrate its error.
In fact, there is no such finding of the District Court. There is Conclusion of Law
No. 23, which states that a certain fax "did not evidence an intent . . . to waive . . . . " It is
questionable, therefore, whether, under Rule 24(a)(9), U.R.A.P., marshalling of evidence is
required.
Nevertheless, appellants have marshaled all the evidence. Appellee is unable to
designate any pertinent evidence overlooked.
What the evidence shows is not only appellee's waiver of partition in the
circumstances of this case, but appellee's written promise not to go forward without a "joint
venture" of the development with appellant, rejoining an accounting and sharing of the
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subject development.
Appellee now concedes that the marshaled evidence about the fax constitutes "an
indication", "at the time the 1997 fax was written and reconfirmed", "that [appellee] did not
intend . . . to" - intended not to - "annex [and 'accept a density approval for'] the
Mayflower Property", without appellants' "permission to move forward". Such permission
was to be achieved by "negotiating] a joint venture" with appellants to share the
development. Brief of Appellee at 23. Appellee does not dispute that the partition action
was brought expressly to avoid such negotiation and appellants' demand that appellee
account for and share the development. That is, by permitting appellee a partition without
accounting for and sharing the development, the District Court permitted appellee to breach
its written promise to appellants.
Appellee's "Issue No. 2" is whether the "ruling that the Mayflower Defendants
should be awarded as 'owelty' . . . four . . . 'conditional lots'. . . . " was erroneous in light
of "an express finding of fact that there was no evidence to support . . . entitlement to
additional owelty

" Again, there is no such finding of fact. There is Conclusion of Law

No. 28, that "no evidence was produced as a basis for the Mayflower Defendant's claims
for" particular shares of the development. This ruling must reflect Finding of Fact No. 19
that "no evidence was presented at the time of trial of what the 'net value' ['fair market
value . . . minus the development costs'] of the Northside Neighborhood development lots
would be . . . ." No one could carry that burden, however it was assigned, of proof of
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non-existent, future facts. Because assigning the burden to appellee required a further
proceeding, the District Court simply concluded that the burden was not met.

THE ADMITTED WAIVER WAS ALSO A PROMISE TO ACCOUNT AND
SHARE
The significance of Mr. Rothwell's testimony quoted at pages 24-25 of Appellants'
Brief must be emphasized. It shows on its face a promise not to seek partition in certain
circumstances. It also shows an agreement to account for and fairly share the entire
Flagstaff Development:
Q: You nevertheless promised that you ["] would not annex your property or
accept a density approval for your property "without your notification and
permission." What did you mean by "permission" in that phrase, Mr.
Rothwell?
A: My hope had been that we would be able to negotiate a joint venture with
our land owning partners, with Mayflower, and thereby achieve a permission
to move forward.
Q: And lacking that, your representation was that you will not annex or
accept the density approval.
A: At that time it was.
Tr. 88: 7-89: 5. This promise headed off an earlier proposal about partitioning the
co-tenancy in advance, and removing appellants' share, to enable appellants to negotiate
with Park City separately. Tr. 88: 6-11.
To obtain "permission to move forward" with appellants' land included required
entry into a joint venture to share the development. This reflects appellants' Fact No. 8

(Brief at 8) wholly uncontested by appellee:
UPCM represented to Park City that it would enter into a joint venture with
other owners of land in the Flagstaff Annexation to share the development
proposed by UPCM, and that UPCM was, therefore, a proper representative
of all owners in negotiating the annexation and development plan with Park
City. Tr. 53-54, 100-101, 177-178; Exhibit 7.
The testimony at the cited Transcript pages 100-101 concerned charts (Exhibit 7; see also
Exhibits 4, 5, and 6) attached to draft joint venture agreements proposed by appellee:
Q: What these charts do, Mr. Rothwell, is calculate a participant's share in
an overall based upon the status of the application at the time. Is that not
correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: To be clear about that, when I say the status of the application at the time,
that means the sort of densities and development you were discussing at the
time whether the city approved it or not.
A: Yes. These, were, these were not approved densities.
Q: These are all prospective in that way?
A: That's correct.
Q: And so what you were informing the owners here is that if you were
successful in doing what you were then attempting to do these were the sort
of returns they might expect?
A: Yes.
A brief review of the charts in reference shows that appellee proposed to divide
among participating land owners the total development permitted by Park City in the
Flagstaff Annexation, on various bases of contribution of the various owners, including
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contribution of developable acreage. In none of the various proposals was a minority
owner required to accept the "base density" of his property under the original Summit
County zoning. Of course, the proposals for sharing were made by appellee (see Tr.
103-104), based upon an accounting of amounts, types and value of approvals obtainable,
because the minority owners did not have access to information allowing them to formulate
such a proposal.
Mr. RothweH's testimony, therefore, was that appellee promised appellant in writing
that appellee would not proceed with the development except upon the basis of a joint
venture agreement sharing proportionally the increased development obtained by pooling
the properties, and that appellee would not resort to unilateral annexation and re-zoning,
followed by partition, to avoid this responsibility.
The Complaint recites:
13.

13.

13.

13.

United Park desires to proceed with the development of its portion of
the Summit County property, pursuant to and in accordance with the
terms of the Development Agreement. United Park also desires to
proceed with efforts to obtain approvals from Wasatch County with
respect to the development of its portions of the Wasatch County
Property as quickly as possible.
Since October of 1998, United Park has attempted to negotiate with
Stichting Mountain and Stichting Recreational in order to reach an
agreement regarding the joint development or partition of the property.
Stichting Mountain and Stichting Recreational have been unwilling to
engage in serious discussions or negotiations with United Park with
respect to either the partition or joint development of the Property.
Consequently, United Park has filed this action seeking partition of the
Property.

That is, appellee recognized the duty to negotiate a proportional sharing of the whole
10

development, even after completion of the annexation. The Complaint's recognition of a
duty to negotiate "joint development or partition" obviates any claim appellee could insist
upon partition alone, where appellant demanded an accounting and "joint development".
The District Court's order allowing partition to go forward without an accounting and
sharing of the development, was simply authorization to appellee to violate its promise with
impunity. Equity, which governs partition, requires a different result.
The evidence, tried without objection and in conformity with the Pretrial Order,
shows an agreement not to withdraw appellants' property from the Flagstaff development
project, in return for negotiating a proportional sharing of the development approved. Any
such sharing required the kind of accounting of the development exemplified by the chart,
Exhibits 7, which only appellee could provide.

The February 25, 1997 FAX is a

satisfactory written memorial of the agreement. While the latter part of the agreement
might be objected to as an unenforceable agreement to agree, insisting upon that rule simply
voids the consideration upon which appellant's property was included, when it can no
longer be withdrawn. This creates a fraud.
Of course, the evidence also shows appellees' violation of the agreement, in the
form of the partition. Appellee agreed not to proceed without a joint venture, which
required it to account for and share the development. It agreed that it would not seek
partition without accounting and sharing. It then sued, acknowledging the obligation to
negotiate "joint development", of which an accounting by appellee and sharing of the
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approvals are essential parts. If the District Court did not deny partition to force appellee
to account and share, it had to order an accounting to force appellee to account and share.
While appellee may object that appellants could not force appellee to accept particular
terms for sharing, by seeking partition it has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the court
upon the representation that it will abide by the court's decision of the matter. If appellee
seeks partition it cannot object that appellant seeks accounting and distribution.
Appellee's agreement to account and share may be enforced in equity without need
to show "exclusive use" or "profit" under the usual rule about accounting among co-tenants;
or it may be taken as an admission of these elements of exclusive use and profit. Nor can
appellee now object that the accounting provided by appellants to the District Court is
rudimentary or less exact than possible, having rejected the opportunity to provide the more
complete or more exact accounting which it alone could provide. Appellee does not object
that appellants used inaccurate figures for the total development approved. Appellee was
unable to show any inaccuracy in the calculation of appellants' fourteen percent (14%)
contribution of developable acreage. 1 Of course, appellee cannot claim that contribution
of developable acreage is an irrational basis for sharing, as it was proposed by appellee
itself in discussions for the purpose prior to the annexation. See Exhibit 7.
Certainly, it is no objection to this that "No evidence was presented at the time of
Trial what the 'net value' of the Northside Neighborhood development lots would be and to
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do so at this point would require an expensive trial to determine the fair market value of the
Northside Neighborhood lots minus the development costs of the Northside Neighborhood
lots." Judgment, Finding of Fact No. 11. The other thing it would require was completion
of the approval process and contracting the development costs to provide anything other
than a wholly speculative basis for an opinion what net value 'Svould be", in order to make
the evidence admissible at all. In any case, the district Court was not at liberty to excuse
appellee's duty because compliance was "expensive" or inconvenient.

THE SEPARATE CLAIMS FOR ACCOUNTING AND OWELTY
There is no response, in the District Court's ruling or in appellee's brief, to
appellants' demand for an accounting, or to the admission that appellee promised an
accounting and sharing of the development as a condition to going ahead.
Appellee pretends instead that appellants' demand for an accounting was somehow
indistinct from a claim for owelty, and could be dealt with simultaneously by insisting that
appellants had the burden of proof on the issue of owelty. In fact, the District Court simply
never came to grips with an entirely proper and separate demand for an accounting. Owelty
was only invoked as a power of the court to make equitable adjustments among the parties.
Even absent appellee's promise, two rules would apply here: (1) where any available
physical partition benefits one co-tenant discriminatorily, the Court may adjust the equities

1 Appellee's cynical claim that Mr. Theobald failed to explain the basis for his calculation of fourteen percent because,
when asked for the constituent numbers, Mr. Theobald volunteered to retrieve them, but counsel told him it was
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by an award of "owelty"; and (2) where the imbalance is the profit from one co-tenant's
exclusive use of the co-tenancy, the profiteer must account for it and share it proportionally.
The District Court simply never grasped the fact that once it is shown that any physical
division of the land must give one party more than the other, a fact found by the District
Court here, the burden shifts to the benefited party to quantify the imbalance if it results
from his exclusive use of the co-tenancy, a fact admitted here. The rule applicable where
the imbalance is no co-tenant's fault has no application here.

IT WASN'T WAIVER; IT WAS FRAUD
Appellee now defends its written promise to appellants that partition would not be
sought after appellants' land had been annexed and re-zoned without their consent, by
cynically re-defining the promise as a fraud. "[I]t is reasonable to construe this testimony
simply as an indication by Mr. Rothwell that he did not intend, at the time the 1997 fax was
written and re-confirmed, to annex the Mayflower Property (as opposed to the Summit
County Partition Property) without Mr. Bogerd's permission." Brief at 23. Thus, though
appellee never expressed any such limitation on the promise to appellants, it was free to
break the promise as soon as the words were out of Mr. Rothwell's mouth. (Further, though
the promise speaks only of "your property", appellee was free to regard it as applicable only
to the "Mayflower Property . . . as opposed to the Summit County Partition Property",

unnecessary, deserves no consideration. See Tr. 234: 22-25; 235: 1-12; Appellee's Brief at 30, n. 14.
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though both were undoubtedly "yours".)
This gambit is trumped by the case relied upon by the District Court, Beckstead v.
Deseret Roofing Co., 831 P.2d 130, 153 (Utah 1992), which disallows avoiding an express
waiver by claiming a secret intent to the contrary.
Nor is the fraud excused by appellees' apparent claim that the promise was
subsequently withdrawn by "Mr. Rothwell's subsequent communications with Mr. Bogerd,
including his 1998 telephone conversation and the January 1999 letter, in which he
informed the Mayflower defendants that United Park was in fact proceeding with the
proposed annexation and development." The phone call and letter are described at pp.
21-22 of appellees' Brief.
Of course, as a general rule a written promise cannot be orally withdrawn. This
eliminates the alleged phone call if withdrawal was its purpose. Nevertheless, it exposes
the depth of appellees' cynicism to address the alleged call. It is cited to Mr. Rothwell's
testimony, Tr. 43: 2-44: 14.
The cited testimony begins:
Q: And at any point in time after you sent and reconfirmed Exhibit U did you
send Mr. Bogerd a letter indicating that United Park was proceeding with its
development plans?
A: I did not
It is true that Mr. Rothwell said, "We had notified Mr. Bogerd by phone that we were
moving forward with annexation and development." Tr. 43: 24-44:1. No date or time,
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however, is indicated. Further, the purpose of this communication 66was to bring to fruition
a, a negotiation . . . that we had attempted to have with Mayflower in regards to a joint
venture proposal to move forward with the development of the jointly owned property."
Tr. 44: 1-5. Further on, in this testimony, a letter from Bogerd to Park City is identified:
A: I n . . . yes, about the same date that it was written. This was a, a, we were
negotiating with Park City in a, in September, August and September of '98
for, around the development parameters they were called at that time for the
annexation of the property. And a, this was a letter sent by Mr. Bogerd
objecting to the annexation, and the letter was read into the public record in
Park City as part of the process.
Tr. 45: 5-12. The Bogerd letter, dated September 3, 1998, recites a local newspaper
announcement that the annexation proposal was to be called for a vote September 3, 1998
and protests.
In fact, as appellee acknowledges (Statement of Facts, ^ 11, p. 15, Brief), "on
September 15, 1998" (actually, September 10, 1998 according to Park City Ordinance
99-30, Tab E, Appendix to Brief of Appellee), the Park City Council approved the
proposed annexation and development parameters. (Ordinance 99-30 was not actually
finalized until June 24, 1999, but the delay was unrelated to the dispute between these
parties. No further vote was taken.) Thus, if appellees' point is to connect the alleged
phone call to the events of early September 1998, the only conclusion to be drawn is that
appellee, at the eleventh hour, advised appellants that they were about to be annexed and
re-zoned against their will, and appellants' last ditch effort to avoid this result failed.
Mr. RothwelPs subsequent letter of January 21, 1999 (see testimony recited p. 25,
16

Brief of Appellants) offered the cold comfort that appellee would take advantage of the
vote it had procured to "finalize our plans with Park City Municipal and delete Mayflower
property from that Master Planning effort." Either this was a false representation that
appellants' land would be spared the restrictions imposed on it by the September vote, or a
cynical threat to deny it any benefits of the vote.
The suggestion that these communications somehow advised appellants that they
had been tricked by the earlier promise, and allowed them opportunity to save themselves,
is cynical hogwash. At best, they advised appellants that the trap had been sprung. This is
confessed by Mr. Rothwell's last testimony on the representation that appellee would
"delete Mayflower property from the master planning effort":
Q: That really could not [be] done without deleting them from the annexation,
could it?
A: No.
Tr. 90: 1-3.

THE REFEREES' REPORT
When the referees investigated and wrote their report, they did not speak to any Park
City official. Tr.137: 13-19. The UPCM officers and employees to whom they did speak
did not inform them that Park City would not approve any development on any property,
unless it was able to annex to the Summit County boundary. Tr.138: 25-140: 1. Thus, the
Referees' Report does not ask whether the quid pro quo for approving density on appellee's
17

"lower mountain" property was annexing and down-zoning the "upper mountain",
including appellants' property. Regarding whether "base density" under the one unit per
forty acres Summit County zoning had been "transferred" from the "upper mountain" to the
"lower mountain", they concluded that "base density" had simply been clustered in one area
of the "upper mountain". As a result, the Referees' Report deals only with proportional
allocation of the area of clustering of "base density" on the "upper mountain". Tr. 139:
16-25; 140: 1.
These matters were clarified at trial, and appellee's witness, Mr. Rosecrans,
unequivocally testified that had he known what appellee now admits - that Park City's
condition for annexing and permitting development on appellee's land was that it annex
and limit development on appellants' equally developable land (Appellee's Brief at 13, %
5; uncontested Fact No. 18, p. 11, Brief of Appellants) - he would have insisted on a greater
allocation of "density" to appellants. Tr. 151: 19-152: 13; Ruling, 07/13/04 at 5-6.
Appellee now asserts that appellants have claimed "transfer of density" and engages in
deceptive editing of the transcript to create the impression that the referees, being fully
informed, found that no such claimed "transfer of density" had occurred.
The overall burden of Mr. Rothwell's and Mr. Theobald's testimony is that such
conclusions as the Referees may have drawn about re-assigning "transferred density" were
based on a lack of information; provided the facts testified to by appellee's witnesses
Rothwell and Jackson, Mr. Rosecrans would have joined Mr. Theobald and reached
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opposite conclusions. The District Court plainly caught the drift: Tr. 163: 9-16):
THE JUDGE [to Mr. Rosecrans]: And if I can summarize your testimony
now that you've been made aware of the fact that a, that Park City was
demanding that there be full, to approve annexation it had to be annexation to
the Wasatch County line that a, your, you think that there might possibly be
a need for additional compensation for the perceived or allocation of density
from the upper mountain to the lower mountain?
The District Court agreed with "two referees, Mr. Rosecrans and Mr. Theobald" that
"the whole quantum of development allowed . . . for the Flagstaff Annexation" "must be
shared proportionally among the parties in order to render any partition equitable." Ruling
07/13/04 at 4-5. It found, however, that "no evidence was produced as a basis for "the share
of development claimed by Mayflower." Id. at 5.
This was because "no evidence was presented at the time of trial what the 'net value'
of the Northside Neighborhood development lots would be and to do so at this point would
require an expensive trial to determine the fair market value of the Northside Neighborhood
lots minus the development costs of the Northside Neighborhood lots." Finding No. 19.
Appellee brought its partition action before it applied for final approvals for the
development in the Flagstaff Annexation. That is, the ultimate number, location, size and
type of the units of permissible development or their costs or value, were not known when
the partition was conducted and the ruling issued. No doubt this choice was made to allow
appellee maximum flexibility in obtaining final approval for the maximum amount of
development. Appellee sought a partition which gave to appellee all land zoned for
development in the Flagstaff Annexation, according appellant none of it.
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Thus, the burden of proof to "determine the fair market value" of the development,
or "what the 'net value'... would be" - was impossible to carry no matter who bore it. The
District Court declined to contemplate a further proceeding in which such proof could be
provided, because "to do so at this point would require an expensive trial."
In short, the District Court has permitted appellee, by controlling the timing of the
partition action, to control the result.
It seems plain that the questionable rationale of this decision also affected the
District Court's decision whether appellee had waived a partition in the circumstances. The
rationale that appellee's president had "testified unequivocally that he was not
contemplating a partition of the joint property at the time the note was written and that he
never intended to waive United Park's right to partition", is simply false: there was no such
testimony. The real rationale was that refusing a partition pending the accounting and
sharing of the development promised, would require a further "expensive" proceeding.

THE QUID QUO PRO
Appellee now asserts that appellants did not show that the quid pro quo for allowing
development of appellee's land was annexing and restricting development on appellants'
land. In fact, however, appellee admits this:
5. Park City insisted on extension of the proposed annexation to the Summit
County line. See Final Order & J. at ^| 15, appended hereto at Tab A; Tr. at
36: 9-20, R. at 1250. Park City also insisted that it would not annex without
a development agreement defining the amount, type and approximate
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location of development permissible within the annexed property, and
imposed other requirements. See Final Order & J. at 5, ^f 14., R. at 1250,
appended hereto at Tab A.
Brief of Appellee at 13 (emphasis added). The quid pro quo for a Development Agreement
locating all enhanced development on appellee's land was inclusion of appellants' land in
the same Development Agreement, which located no such development on appellants' land.
It was unnecessary to call Park City witnesses on these points. As appellee's Brief now
admits, the parties' testimony about them was entirely consistent.
Appellee does no better with the claim that Rothwell's testimony shows that Park
City annexed simply to "avoid islands and peninsulas of unincorporated property."
Rothwell's attempt to testify what Park City told him about this was stricken (Tr. 35:25,36:
1-8) and appellee's current claim about Mr. Rothwell's "understanding" of the City's
motives is belied by appellee's present admission that Park City annexed "to maintain
control over the development in the area of the proposed Flagstaff Mountain Resort". Brief
at 14, f 10. The latter reflects Mr. Jackson's testimony as well that "it was Park City's
fanatic desire to control development...." Tr. 266: 5-6.
Nor does appellee correctly describe annexation. The record here indicates that
appellee sought a partition by which appellants received a consolidated parcel on the
Summit/Wasatch County boundary. In fact, that is the result of the present partition. There
is no reason to suppose appellants could not have achieved this in their own proceeding. In
that case, there would have been no owner's signature on the annexation petition for this

21

land, nor would it have been enclosed within land the owners of more than fifty percent of
which had signed, and it could not have been annexed.
The suggestion, in any case, that any ability of appellee to force appellants into an
annexation carried with it power to down-zone appellants' land by agreement between Park
City and appellee, ignores the prohibition against contract zoning.

CONCLUSIONS
There is no substantial dispute of facts in this case.
Appellee sought to annex its property to Park City to foster a development scheme
that sought to greatly increase the native density permitted for the land under its Summit
County zoning by clustering on discrete parcels. Park City declined to annex, unless it also
got control of appellants' property, the bulk of which was a co-tenancy with appellee, to
prevent its use in a similar scheme under Summit County jurisdiction.
Only appellee's signature was needed to include the latter property in the annexation
petition, but appellants could have thwarted the addition by seeking partition in advance.
Appellee, therefore, promised that it would not go forward with the annexation and
development scheme except upon entering a joint venture with appellants for any
development approved. It informed Park City that it would make such a joint venture; thus,
it was empowered unilaterally to negotiate development parameters with Park City. Any
such joint venture necessarily required an accounting and sharing of the development.
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In fact, appellee prosecuted and obtained the annexation without a joint venture.
The development scheme imposed approved preliminarily a vastly enhanced developability
on appellee's land alone. It limited appellants' land to its native density under the Summit
County zoning, and eliminated all opportunity for enhanced development.
The Complaint appears to confess that Park City then sent appellee back to negotiate
a fair sharing of the development with appellants prior to seeking final approvals. Instead,
appellee filed the present partition action, demanding that all land zoned for development
by Park City be partitioned to appellee.
Upon being fully informed of the facts, a majority of referees appointed by the
District Court concurred that a proportional sharing of the entire development preliminarily
approved was essential to any equitable partition.
The partition action, however, preceded final approval of the amount, location, size
and type of the development, and any reasonable basis for assessing costs of development
and market values. Thus, except for defining a proportional share of a not-yet defined total,
accounting for the development and sharing it monetarily, requires a further proceeding.
An order denying partition pending the accounting and sharing promised by appellee,
would require a further proceeding.
The District Court was determined to avoid a further proceeding. It selected
injustice in lieu of inconvenience.
To avoid the obvious waiver of a partition without an accounting and sharing, the
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District Court inverted the testimony of appellee's president regarding an acknowledged
promise not to proceed without appellants' consent. To avoid a further proceeding, the
District Court relied upon a Referee's Report no longer supported by a majority of referees.
It finessed its refusal to deal with appellants' demand for an accounting from appellee, by
merely concluding, without actually assigning the burden of proof, that "no evidence was
produced" of the value of appellee's profits. It calculated "owelty" on a basis its own
Ruling acknowledges is inadequate, justifying the ruling on the ground that evidence of
future value which did not then exist was not then produced.
The Judgment must be reversed, and remanded to the District Court to take
appropriate steps to sequester proceeds of the development, pending a further proceeding
accounting for net value of the development finally approved and sold, and sharing of such
value in the proportion established in the initial proceeding.

DATED this 9th day of August, 2005.

s

E. Craig Smay
Attorney for Mayiower
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing "REPLY
BRIEF " to be mailed this 9th day of August, 2005, to the following:
Laura S. Scott (6649)
Michael Petrogeorge (8870)

PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorney for UPCM
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45898
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
fx: (801) 536-6111

E. Craig Smay
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